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1 . Introduction
Argentina's economic development over the last thirty years has
been dominated by very high and variable inflation rates. There
is widespread agreement that the financial sector is most seri-
ously affected by persistent inflation. This was also true for
Argentina. Due to interest rate ceilings and other regulations
relative yields on particular financial assets have been affected
differently by inflation. While the holdings of non-interest
bearing assets (currency in circulation and demand deposits) were
fully exposed to the inflation tax , time deposits at a controll-
ed rate or indexed deposits were partially protected from infla-
tion losses, however, at varying degrees. As a consequence there
was a tendency to substitute money in circulation and demand
deposits for interest-bearing, short-term assets. On the whole,
the attempt to avoid the inflation tax resulted in a demoneti-
zation of the economy. Since banks and non-bank financial in-
stitutions relied on different financial instruments they were
differently affected by the impact of the inflation tax on the
holdings of financial asset. Furthermore, inflation rates and
real interest rates have been more variable when inflation was
extremely high. This involved large-scale arbitrage possibilities
by shifting funds from one financial asset into another. Such
speculative movements had heavy repercussions on banks and non-
bank financial institutions and added to the instability of the
financial sector as a whole.
As to credits strong fluctuations of relative prices in goods
markets have made the evaluation of creditworthiness more compli-
The inflation tax is equivalent to the loss of purchasing power
of financial assets which is not offset by interest-payments.- 2 -
cated. Both the shortening of maturities on the deposit side and
the difficulties in assessing credit risks have generated a ten-
dency towards shortening the maturity of credit operations too,
i.e., the financial system was no longer able to perform ade-
quately its function as a "transformator" of maturities between
active and passive operations. As a consequence long-term invest-
ments are no longer financed by the private financial system.
More generally, a disintermediation process took place which
resulted in a dramatic increase of per unit financial operational
costs (Fischer, Trapp 1985a, p. 13) and, finally, threatened to
lead to a collapse of the financial sector in 1982.
When inflation rates remained persistingly high and external
adjustment was impeded by maintaining an overvaluation of the
exchange rate conventional sources to finance the public sector
deficit could no longer be exploited. Therefore, in order to
satisfy its financing needs the government had to rely more and
more on the inflation tax. However, since an accelerated erosion
of the purchasing power of money propelled the process of demone-
tization of the economy the base from which the inflation tax
could be levied declined steadily and the maintenance of a given
public deficit required higher and higher tax rates, i.e., more
inflation .
Efforts to control the monetary expansion, to improve the collec-
tion of the inflation tax and to maintain a diversified structure
of the financial system resulted in heavy interventions into the
2
financial markets in Argentina . For some time, legal reserve re-
quirements have been kept at 100 p.c, thus deposits have been
"nationalized", and lending activities exclusively depended on
discretionary rediscount facilities opened up by the monetary
authorities. Under such regulations, financial institutions lost
For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Fischer and
Trapp, 1985b.
2
Financial policies in Argentina from 1973 to 1984 are analysed
















































































































































aAt 1970 constant prices; Tton-financial public sector;
 cCurrency in circulation and demand deposits;
Consumer prices of Greater Buenos Aires, annual average;
 eIncludes net current transfers; Estimate.
U)
Source: BCRA, FIEL, IFS.- 4 -
their intermediation role between savers and investors and were
degraded to administrative branches of the Central Bank. During
the liberalization period from 1976 to 1981 the government tried
to restablish a fractional reserve system. Given the high rate of
inflation banks as compared to non-bank institutions which were
not allowed to offer non-interest demand deposits enjoyed a com-
petitive advantage which could not be diminished by differential
reserve ratios. In order to maintain a diversified structure of
the financial sector and to ensure a broadly-based collection of
the inflation tax the Central Bank adopted a uniform reserve
ratio for all deposits and introduced an additional regulation
mechanism, the monetary regulation account (Cuenta de Regulaci6n
Monetaria).
In chapter 2 the problem of monetary control under high inflation
is discussed in the Argentine context. The basic idea of the
monetary regulation account is presented by using a simple model
in chapter 3. In chapter 4 reference to Argentina's experiences
with this regulation mechanism is made, empirical evidence is
given for its financial sector impact and its inflationary ef-
fects.
2. Fiscal Deficits and Monetary Control
Since 1970 Argentina experienced a considerable widening of the
public sector deficit (Table 1). At the same time money supply
(Ml) and subsequently the inflation rate rose dramatically, espe-
cially in 1976 and since 1983. During the liberalization period
an increasing part of the public sector deficit was financed in
the domestic credit market (bank credits and bond sales). From
1980 to mid-1982 the government even increased its indebtedness
in international credit markets (Table 2). Since the funds were
hardly used for productive purposes but mainly spent on consump-
tion goods, prestige projects, and income transfers there was no
increase in real income providing the revenues from which the
debt service could be paid. Concerning the external debt it be-
came increasingly difficult to make due interest payments in the
course of 1982 because of insufficient export earnings and rising- 5 -
Table 2 - Financing of the Public Sector Deficit, Argentina
1970-1984
Financing of the Deficit
(p.c.)










102.5 ' 36.1 -38.6
69.3 55.4 -24.7
50.0 71.1 -21.1





Figures differ from those in Table 1 because of a different de-
finition of the public sector deficit. - ^Estimates.





































international interest rates. Due to interest payment arrears Ar-
gentina was finally barred from any further access to the inter-
national capital market in 1983.
But even before the external debt problem emerged private savings
were not sufficient to provide the funds needed to finance pri-
vate investment and the public sector deficit. Faced with acce-
lerating rates of inflation financing the deficit in the domestic
credit market became more and more unfeasible because the high
nominal rates of interest, required to attract private sector
savings, contributed to increase the fiscal deficit even more and
had a depressing effect on private investment activity. As a
consequence, credit from the Central Bank has always been used
heavily to finance part of the deficit. Since the mid-82 the
printing of money practically became the only source of finance
for the public sector deficit.
In order to offset the expansionary effect of large Central Bank
credits to the public sector on the money supply, monetary au-
thorities had to keep the credit creation by the banking sector
under strict control. An instrument widely used in Argentina for
this purpose was to impose high reserve ratios on peso-denominat-
ed deposits. In 1973 and in mid-1982 reserve ratios were even
raised to 100 p.c. . During these periods any bank lending to the
private sector was dependent on rediscount facilities provided by
the Central Bank. Lending and deposit rates were controlled.
Since lending rates were negative in real terms, some kind of
credit rationing was necessary. As the banks were acting merely
as agents of the Central Bank risk and profitability evaluations
of credit transactions were considered to be of minor importance,
borrowing became mainly a function of lobbyist power.
From the point of view of a more efficient functioning of the
banking sector a fractional reserve system would have been a more
For a description of that period see Fischer and Trapp 1985a,
P. 14.- 7 -
attractive alternative. However, under very high rates of infla-
tion reserve ratios cannot be determined in such a way as to
preserve the variety and the stability of the financial sector
and to allow an effective control of monetary expansion at the
same time. As will be demonstrated in the following section, an
additional regulation mechanism was needed in order to accomplish
both functions. This mechanism was introduced in Argentina in
1977 as part of a financial reform program under the name Cuenta
de Regulaci6n Monetaria (Monetary Regulation Account - MRA).
3. The General Scheme of the Monetary Regulation Account
In this chapter the rationale and the functioning of the MRA is
explained under the following assumptions : There are two types
of financial institutions in the financial system, namely banks
(B) holding non-interest bearing demand deposits (D) and non-bank
financial institutions (F) holding only time deposits (T) . The
total amount of credit granted at an interest rate (iR) is the
same for each institution. The reserve ratios imposed on the
financial system are (r_) for time deposits and (rn) for demand
deposits.
Under these conditions the net financial returns for time depo-
sits (TT_) and demand deposits (ir ) in per unit terms are:
(1) 7rT = (l-rT)iK - iT - cp
(2) uD = d-rD)iK - cB
where (c ) and (c ) are the operative costs of non-bank financial
institutions and of banks, respectively. Comparing (1) and (2) it
is clear that non-bank financial institutions are in a disadvant-
Detailed informations on the more technical aspects of the MRA
are provided by Ruiz and Otero, 1983.- 8 -
age because they have to pay interest on deposits. When r = r_ =
r_ financial returns are much higher for banks, therefore non-
bank financial institutions are not competitive under such cir-
cumstances . However, assuming low inflation rates and c_, < cD
it is possible to equalize the net returns of both types of depo-
sits by imposing a reserve ratio on demand deposits which is
sufficiently higher than that on time deposits, i.e., establish-
ing a differentiated reserve requirement system which is well
known from many industrialized countries.
If rT = 0.3 , rD = 0.6 , iR = 0.05 , iT = 0.03 , cp = 0.005 and
cD = 0.01 net returns on both demand and time deposits would
amount to 1 p.c. of the total amount of deposits. However, with
very high inflation rates - e.g. more than 100 p.c. per annum -
such a differentiated reserve system cannot equalize the rates of
return on both kinds of deposits. The reason for this is that the
inflation tax on demand deposits in part remains in the banking
sector. The reserve ratio determines the share of the inflation
tax revenues which go to the treasury, the remaining revenues
increase bank profits. In order to have at least a net financial
return of nT = 0 the difference between the interest rate on
credits and on time deposits (spread) must be at least equal to
the right hand side of the following equation which is derived
from (1) :
ni (la)
If r = 0 the spread required to achieve IT™ = 0 would be equal to
the operative costs (cp) and for
 rT > 0 it would have to be
larger. It becomes extremely large when - like in the case of
Argentina - reserve ratios are in the order of 50 p.c. or more
because part of the base money increase created by Central Bank
financed budget deficits has to be absorbed and when interest
Assuming e.g., r=rT=rD=0.1, iK=0.1, iT=0.075 and cF=cB=0.005,
earnings per unit of time deposits are 1 p.c. and earnings per
unit of demand deposits are 8.5 p.c. If banks reduce the lend-
ing rate to 8 p.c. non-bank financial institutions would incure
losses which eventually would force them to drop out of the
market.- 9 -
rates on time deposits are extraordinarily high due to high in-
flation . In an open economy with no major restrictions on capi-
tal flows such interest rates would attract foreign capital and
lead to the breakdown of the non-bank financial institutions.
Taking into account international capital markets the limits for
the domestic interest rates are
(3b) iT _< iT _< iR and
* *
(3c) iT _< iR _< iR
where: i = iR + d +
i* = i£ + d
e + a + c" ,
a
iK = international interest rate for credits,
i = international interest rate for time deposits,
d
e = expected rate of devaluation,
a = exchange rate risk,
c',c"= transaction costs.
If the net return on time deposits shall be positive or zero then
the reserve ratio on time deposits has to be determined according
to the following expression
r _<
1
With r = 0.5, i,_ = 3.0 and cp = 0 the gross spread (i - i )
required to have a zero net return on time deposits would
amount to 3 00 percentage points.- 10 -
ir is zero if r is equal to the right-hand term. Equations (la)
and (Id) suggest that non-bank financial institutions can only
survive if the reserve ratio for time deposits is very low or
even close to zero.
The corresponding maximum value for reserve ratio for demand
deposits is given by
(2a) r_ _ 1 - .
XK
From this it is clear that for a given value of r_ bank profits
will be the bigger the higher interest rates are due to infla-
tion. Under a regime of very high inflations the maximum value
for rn consistent with a zero net return on demand deposits will
be close to one.
The equilibrium condition for the financial sector requires that
net financial returns on both types of assets are equal:
(3) (l-rT)iK - iT - cp = d-rD)iK - cB
Although in principal it is possible to get a combination of rD
and r which fullfils equation (3) it is, however, not very like-
ly that this set of reserve ratios is consistent with the ob-
jective to control monetary expansion effectively . Thus, under
very high inflation rates it is impossible to guarantee the sta-
bility of the financial system and to control credit expansion by
a fractional reserve system.
This can be demonstrated by a numerical example. The average
reserve ratio considered to be necessary to control the money
supply is 50 p.c. (r = 0.5) 30 p.c. of total deposits are held
as demand deposits, 70 p.c. as time deposits at an interest
rate of 300 p.c. (iT = 1). The interest rate on credits is 110
p.c. (rK = 1.1), Cp and cB are assumed to be zero. The reserve
ratios necessary Co maintain the stability of the financial
sector could be for time deposits zero p.c. (r_ = 0) and for
demand deposits 90 p.c. (rD = 0.9) . The average reserve ratio
of 27 p.c. resulting from this hypothetical numerical system is
however different from the reserve ratio consistent with the
stabilization target (50 p.c).- 31 -
In order to achieve both targets the Monetary Regulation Account
was established in Argentina in 1977 . Under this system there
are uniform reserve ratios for both kinds of deposits. Further-
more, banks have to pay a fee on the holdings of demand deposits
and non-bank financial institutions receive a compensation on the
reserve component of interest bearing deposits. Thus, by taxing
the profits stemming from the lending capacity of demand deposits
and by paying interest on reserves for time deposits net returns
on both kinds of deposits are equalized. The main idea behind
this regulation was to avoid the discrimination of non-bank fi-
nancial institutions resulting from an uniform reserve ratio by
2 reducing the banks' gross spread. In addition, it was intended to
ensure a complete collection of the inflation tax.
Given this system net returns on time deposits and on demand
deposits in per unit terms are defined as follows:
(4) ,*, = (1-r) • iK + r • icQ - iT - Cp
(5) ^ = (1-r) • iK - (1-r-e) • iQa - cR
where: i = rate of compensation for the reserves hold on
time deposits,
i = rate of charge on the lending capacity of de-
mand deposits,
e = rate free of charge on the lending capacity of
demand deposits.
Under the assumptions that cB > cp and i = i = i it follows
from (4) and (5) : N
For a discussion of alternative solutions see Arriazu, 1983.
2
With a uniform reserve ratio non-bank financial institutions
would disappear from the financial sector unless their opera-
tive costs are considerably lower than those of banks. This,
however, is not likely to be the case because of the high ad-
ministrative costs involved in banking operations under high
inflation rates.- 12 -
(4a) irj = (iR - iT) • (1-r) - cp
(5a) irg = (iR - iT) • (1-r) + e • i? - cfi
The equalization of T\" and ir" then requires:
(6) e = ?—^
Equation (6) shows that the MRA ensures the stability of the
financial sector independent of the level of the reserve ratio
which can now be chosen solely for stabilization purposes. How-
ever, whether the monetary regulation account itself is neutral
with respect to inflation or not depends of the balance between
total receipts and total expenditures.
The MRA obtains resources from the financial sector by charging
the lending capacity of demand deposits. Total receipts (R) are:
(7) R = (1-r-e) • D • i
On the other hand the MRA pays interest on legal reserves finan-
cial institutions have to hold for time deposits at the Central
Bank. Total compensation (E) amounts to:
(8) E = r • T • i
The saldo (S) of the MRA then can be calculated as
(9) S = E-R = r • T • i - (1-r-e) D • i
ca ca
The reserve ratio needed to keep the MRA in balance requires S=0
and in order to equalize the net returns of time deposits and
demand deposits it is necessary that i = i Thus it follows c ca co
from (9)BibHothek dei Institute
fflr WtlUvirtichaft Ktel
- 13 -
If equation (10) is fulfilled the MRA is neutral with respect to
monetary expansion . A shift from demand deposits to time depo-
sits has to be accompanied by a reduction or r or e; otherwise
the MRA will run a deficit because revenues are declining and
compensation payments are increasing. Thus there will be an ex-
pansionary effect on money supply stemming from the MRA. Because
this kind of substitution between the two deposits is to be ex-
pected when (expected) inflation rates rise and opportunity costs
of holding non-interest bearing deposits increase rapidly, there
is an element of instability inherent in the regulation system.
Therefore, the neutrality of the system with respect to monetary
expansion which can be shown for a given structur of total depo-
sits is no longer valid when the dynamics of inflation are taken
into account.
4. Financial Sector Impact and Inflationary Effects of the MRA
The financial disintermediation caused by high and accelerating
inflation and negative real rates of interest (Table A2) is
clearly indicated by the development of the liquidity coeffi-
cients (Table 3). The ratio of money - broadly defined (M2) - to
GDP declined from 25.1 p.c. in 1970 to a low of 9.6 p.c. in 1976.
Although the interest rate liberalization policies introduced in
July 1977 led to a temporary increase of the ratio to 25.4 p.c.
in 1980, the June 1982 financial reform again reinforced the -
disintermediation process and led to a fall of the M2 to GDP
1 The neutrality conditions of the MRA in a macroeconomic frame-
work are discussed by Salama, 1984.
2 In a system of legal reserves differentiated by type of depo-
sits this substitution affects the money multipler.- 14 -
Table 3 - Liquidity Coefficients , Argentina 1970-1984






























































Monetary aggregates deflated by the index of wholesale
prices (1970 = 100) divided by real GDP at market prices
-
 b 1st half of 1984.
Source; BCRA, FIEL.- 15 -
ratio to 12.4 p.c. in 1983 . Disintermediation went along with
demonetization, as can be seen by the marked decline of the Ml/
GDP ratio. At the same time the Argentine Central Bank tried by
means of the Monetary Regulation Account to maintain a differen-
tiated institutional framework of the financial system (Table Al)
by equalizing the net returns of demand deposits and interest
bearing time deposits. The result was that the financial sector
2 became increasingly overextended .
Not only the excessive number of financial institutions but also
the high degree of concentration indicate that the Argentine
financial sector is working in an inefficient way. In 1982, some
9 p.c. of the 133 domestic-owned private banks with net worths
equal or greater than 1.0 billion pesos (US$ 21.7 million) offer-
ed around 68 p.c. of the total loans within this group. As to the
number of non-bank financial institutions there have been 111
finance companies with a share of only 2.2 p.c. of total loans
and 28 of those institutions provided about 48 p.c. of the cred-
its provided by this subgroup (Table Al).
While the structure of the financial sector could be maintained
by the Monetary Regulation Account only at high economic costs it
remains the question if this regulation mechanism has been suc-
cessful in terms of controlling monetary expansion. According to
equation (10) the ratio of demand deposits to time deposits has
to be equal to the expression to ensure neutrality of
1-r-e
the MRA with respect to monetary expansion. In order to evaluate
Compared with countries like Brazil (29.1) and South-Korea
(41.4), ranking in per capita-income terms below Argentina,
this is a rather poor performance of financial deepening. See
Fischer and Trapp, 1985a, p. 18.
An important reason for the former expansion of the institu-
tional framework was the deposit insurance system. The full
government coverage allowed potentially insolvent financial
intermediaries to compete effectively for funds by offering
slightly higher yields.- 16 -
the monetary effects of the MRA this relationship has to be ana-
lyzed. For this purpose it is useful to distinguish several
phases. The data from mid-1977 to mid-1984 are given in Table 4.
In the period from the implementation in June 1977 to 1979/IV the
MRA was in deficit . The decline of demand deposits to time depo-
sits ratio was not offset by an adequate reduction of the reserve
ratio (r) or an increase of the free margin (e) because this
would have been inconsistent with the desired monetary expansion.
As a consequence the negative balance of the MRA itself contri-
buted to the expansion of the monetary base and thus fueled in-
flation.
When the process of financial disintermediation came temporarily
to a stop (1980) while the reserve ratio continued to decrease
and the free margin was further raised the MRA moved into a sur-
plus exerting a contractive effect on the monetary base. However,
due to an acceleration of the inflationary process the shift from
demand deposits to time deposits started again in the first quar-
ter of 1981 whereas r and e remained more or less at the same
level. As a consequence there was again an expansionary monetary
effect from the deficit of the MRA.
In the second half of 1982 the reserve ratio was raised to 1
which actually meant a complete control of credit expansion.
Although in 1983 the reserve ratio was lowered somewhat it re-
mained very high and financial institutions had to rely heavily
on rediscount loans from the Central Bank. The figures in Table 4
indicate that the MRA had very expansive effects on the money
When the MRA was introduced the ratio (=) was 0.59 and clearly
higher than the numerical value of (,_^_ = 0.45) necessary for
the "equilibrium". j- 17 -
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ith respect to the previous month. - In February 1978 the rate of charge and the rate of compensation were unified.
Source: BCRA.- 18 -
supply in that period. However, since deposits were more or less
nationalized the deficit cannot be interpreted without taking
into account to'other positions of the balance sheet of the Cen-
tral Bank, in particular rediscount loans which were allowed to
expand sharply in order to compensate for the liquidity drain
resulting from the increase in reserve ratios. Interest paid by
the Central Bank on deposits has to be compared with interest
payments received by the Central Bank on those rediscount loans
which were necessary to allow banks to continue existing credit
contracts . For such an analysis, however, the accounting prac-
tices of the Central Bank and of the banking system have to be
improved in order to provide up to date information on the actual
2
volume of deposits and loans .
To sum up, the empirical evidence on the monetary effects of the
Monetary Regulation Account in Argentina suggests, that this
mechanism was by no way neutral concerning the expansion of the
monetary base although one has to keep in mind that an accurate
judgement of the impact of the MRA is not possible due to statis-
tical deficiencies.
5. Final Remarks
The evaluation of the Argentine experience with the Monetary
Regulation Account has shown that under conditions of very high
and variable inflation rates the structure of the financial sec-
tor can only be maintained at high economic costs in terms of a
Fiscal aspects of the MRA are analyzed by Murphy, 1984.
2
At present, e.g., deposits and credits are only adjusted irre-
gularly for accrued interest. Since annual interest amounts to
a multiple of the original deposit or credit failure to take
into account due interest payments can lead to a considerable
distortion of the balance sheet items.- 19 -
highly inefficient financial sector. The regulations applied in
Argentina could not prevent the continuation of the process of
financial disintermediation and demonetization caused by rising
inflation rates. As a result the financial sector became - com-
pared to the volume of deposits and credits in real terms -
grossly overextended. Furthermore the controls proved not to be
neutral with respect to the monetary base and thus did not im-
prove the control of the money supply.
The Argentine example clearly demonstrates that it is extremely
difficult - if not impossible - to control monetary expansion and
to maintain the functioning of the financial system if there is
not a serious attempt to eliminate the main sources of inflation
which in Argentina - as in most other countries suffering under
severe inflationary pressures - stem from huge deficits of the
public sector.- 20 -
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9. Total 413 100.0 1 615.7 100.0 167.6 100.0
Cotposed by banks owned by the federal government, state governments and muni-
cipalities, . Official and private domestic and foreign banks.
Source: BCRA..- 22 -
Table A2 - Selected Interest Rates, Argentina 1978-1984/11
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aUp to 1977 for the highest interest rates recorded, then up to 30 days deposits. -
b1973-77 deflated by the Wholesale Price Index, 1978-84 II deflated by the CARTECO
c d
 y
Price Index. - Deflated by the Consumer Price Index.- Interest rates an bank accept-
ances.
Source: BCRA; Cavallo, Petrei, 1980; El Cronista Comercial, 1984; FIEL; Om calcula-
tions.